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F or many retailers, markdown decisions are taken by retail buyers whose compensation is based on sales revenue sotheir objective is to maximize it through the season. This implies that the buyers’ objectives are not perfectly aligned
with the overall profitability the firm. Many retailers set markdown budgets prior to the season to control margin erosion
and increase profitability. Markdown budget constrains the buyers on the amount of discounts that they can apply on a
given inventory of merchandise and sets a limit on the dollar value of markdowns for the season. While markdown bud-
gets may be useful in preventing excessive discounts, they can have a detrimental effect on the buyers’ ability to respond
to poor market and remove distressed inventory. We investigate the effectiveness of this practice in aligning the incentives
of buyers with that of the firm, and provide guidance on how these budgets should be established ahead of time. We con-
sider a firm with a fixed inventory of a seasonable item, and a single chance to mark the price down. The retailer knows
only the demand distribution at the beginning of the season, but the market information is revealed during the season to
the buyer. We first characterize the buyer’s markdown policy and understand the circumstances under which this can be
different from the retailer’s markdown policy. We use our model to determine the optimal markdown budget and quan-
tify its effectiveness considering different factors such as the level of demand uncertainty, initial markup, and market’s
responsiveness to markdowns.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Clearance Sales
For many retailers that sell seasonal goods such as
apparel and accessories, long lead times prohibit
replenishment of stocks during short seasons. For
these companies, markdown is often the only lever to
match supply and demand once they place their
orders and set their initial price. According to some
estimations, a typical retailer sells between 40% and
45% of its merchandise at a discount (The Wall Street
Journal 2012). In U.S. department stores, this ratio
may be as high as 76% for clothing (Daily News
Record 2002). The majority of these discounts are per-
manent markdowns or clearance sales that occur later
in the season to clear distressed inventory as most of
the merchandise has little or no value at the end of the
season. These markdowns are used to correct an ini-
tial mistake of ordering (overbuying) or poor pricing
(high initial mark-ups). In other words, permanent
markdowns are applied in response to an incorrect
initial belief about demand and to clear space for new
products, as discussed in one of the early descriptive
studies by Lazear (1986).1
The major initiatives in industry to better match
demand and supply can be categorized to accurate
response (Fisher and Raman 1996) and quick response
(Iyer and Bergen 1997). These initiatives are of critical
importance in fast-fashion, which is characterized by
affordable prices and frequent assortment changes
(Caro and Gallien 2010). However, this change of
focus from supply efficiency to response agility and
accuracy has not been able to solve the retailers’ prob-
lems completely. Zara, a leading fast fashion retailer,
commits only 15–25% of production before the season
begins, but still sells 15–20% of its items at less than
full price (Fraiman et al. 2012).
While markdowns may not seem to be a very glam-
orous part of business, especially in comparison to
other retail activities such as buying and advertising,
they are often the place where the profits are made or
lost. A carefully planned and executed markdown
may very well salvage an otherwise unsuccessful sea-
son. Many retailers blame excessive markdowns for
their recent financial troubles (The Wall Street Journal
2011). Seeing the impact on the bottom line, many
retailers seek help to optimize their markdowns. The
importance of markdown management is also evident
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from the abundance of software companies active in
this area and the number of patents registered by this
keyword. Many software vendors including IBM,
Oracle, Predictix, Revionics, SAP, and SAS offer
markdown optimization solutions to manage the tim-
ing and depth of markdowns, based on sales trends
and inventory levels (Stores 2012).
1.2. Incentives: Retailer Vs. Buyer
Markdown decisions are usually delegated to retail
fashion buyers (or merchandisers). Buyers have
expertise in fashion trends, may have better demand
information than the retailer, and are in fact respon-
sible for most of the merchandising decisions such as
what items to purchase and how much to order
along with the pricing and markdown decisions for
a specific product category. The incentives of these
buyers may not be perfectly aligned with the prof-
itability of the firm. While there may be different
arguments in favor of delegation of markdown deci-
sions to the buyers, our focus is on the profit losses
caused by incentive misalignment and policies to
limit those losses.
A buyer’s performance evaluation and compensa-
tion is, at least partly, based on total sales of the cate-
gory for which she is responsible (Clodfelter 2012).
The retailer’s overall profitability, however, requires a
proper mix of total sales revenue and profit margin.
This tension between achieving sales goals and main-
taining profitable margins is a recurring theme in
fashion retailing, see, for example, Women Wear
Daily (1996). A factor that contributes to the incentive
misalignment problem is the so-called “Retail Method
of Accounting” which is practiced by an important
number of retailers in many industries including fash-
ion. In this method, the inventory and transactions
are managed in retail dollars at aggregate levels
assuming a constant mark-up percentage across dif-
ferent products. The cost of inventory sold is then cal-
culated by dividing the revenue obtained to the mark-
up percentage while in fact the accounting should be
based on the actual cost paid for the merchandise.
With this cost accounting method, the buyer’s objec-
tive boils down to maximizing sales revenue (since
net profit appears to be a fixed fraction of the sales
revenue) and the buyer’s focus shifts to getting rid of
old merchandise with markdowns (that are earlier
and deeper than what is optimal) and make way for
new merchandise in the category she owns.
The above compensation system implies that the
buyers objective is to maximize revenue, while the
retailers objective is to maximize profit. Notice that
this misalignment problem would not be relevant for
the sales of the existing stock of the current product
alone as the paid cost is sunk and both the retail and
the buyer focus on increasing the revenue.
One tool that is heavily used in practice to control
margin erosion is markdown budget which constrains
the total dollar value of all markdowns a buyer can
use. For instance, if an item with an initial price of $50
is marked down to a new price of $35, over a remain-
ing stock of 1000 items, this decision would consume
$15,000 of the markdown budget. The retailer estab-
lishes a markdown budget prior to the season and the
total amount of discount applied on the inventory at
time of the markdown cannot exceed this budget.
Retailers put in place markdown budgets to limit the
total value of merchandise discounts during the
markdown period, in order to prevent excessive
devaluation of the inventory.
While markdown budgets are common in industry,
their role and whether they are useful is controversial.
In an extensive review of manufacturing and retail
operations in the apparel industry, Sen (2008) states
that “markdowns are usually subject to the buyer’s
budget, limiting the responsiveness of these decisions
to sales activity”. IBM, the provider of the
DemandTec Markdown Optimization solution, con-
siders markdown budgets as one of the primary rea-
sons for retailers not to implement a science-based
markdown solution since staying within the budget
leads to an illusion that the markdown decisions were
effective (IBM 2015). Others including SAS Institute,
SAP and Oracle seem to take the markdown budgets
as input in their software solutions and generate
markdown plans to stay within these budgets (Has-
sanzadeh et al. 2014, Sanli and Yao 2011, Veit et al.
2011). A recent review of markdown optimization
solutions in industry notes that many retailers are
now abandoning their markdown solutions and argue
that competing performance motivations should be
reconciled for the success of new software implemen-
tations (Nemett 2013).
Our review of industrial and research literature
finds no evidence on whether markdown budgets are
more help or hindrance in an environment where the
buyers’ incentives are not perfectly aligned with the
retailer’s overall profitability. We also found no guid-
ance on the process through which these budgets
should be determined prior to the season and the
impact of various factors such as the uncertainty of
demand (the fashion content of the products in ques-
tion) or the market response to markdowns on these
decisions. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature
and investigate how one should manage conflicting
supply chain interests, uncertain demand, and inflexi-
ble supply via markdown budgets.
1.3. Our Setting
We study markdown decisions of a retail firm which
sells a fixed stock of a seasonable/perishable item
over a finite selling season. At the beginning of the
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sales season, the retailer determines the initial price
(or the initial mark-up). Initial prices are determined
manually because of the judgment required to evalu-
ate brands, quality, and design attractiveness (Talluri
and van Ryzin 2004, p. 536). Prior to the season, the
retailer sets the markdown budget.
We assume that the information regarding market
size is fully revealed at the beginning of the sales sea-
son. While this assumption is mainly for simplicity
and tractability, it may be justified partially based on
what is observed in practice. For example, a consul-
tant in fashion industry argues “a week after an item
hits the floor, a merchant knows whether it’s going to
be a dog or a best-seller” (Chain Store Age 1999).
Fisher (2009) also reports that forecasts based on early
sales are significantly better (and are highly accurate)
in comparison to forecasts made prior to season. A
similar assumption is also made in Lago et al. (2016)
in a different setting.
We assume that once the state of the market is
learned, the demand throughout the season is deter-
ministic and the retailer has a single chance of price
change. These assumptions have been used in other
papers as well, e.g., see Whang (2009) where a retai-
ler chooses the timing of markdown as a function of
the current time and his inventory level. As Smith
(2015) argues “because the clearance period is rela-
tively short and sales rates are declining, the early
clearance markdowns tend to be the dominant deci-
sions economically, thus reducing the importance of
multi-stage optimization.” The Wall Street Journal
(2012) reports that “combination of two markdowns
will never be as profitable as a single markdown.
Arriving early enough to tempt customers, the first
markdown gives the greatest boost to profits, and
extra price cuts simply add profit-eroding labor
costs.”
There are other reasons as to why the first mark-
downs provide the lion’s share of the profit compared
to the next rounds of markdowns. First markdowns
are usually placed throughout the store (mixed with
regularly priced products), whereas further mark-
downs are placed in a certain reserved spot in the
store and do not have the same exposure to foot traf-
fic. Further markdowns also take smaller discounts
compared to the first markdown. Finally, first mark-
down prices are still high enough for a good margin,
but subsequent markdowns leave insufficient margin
to cover labor costs.
Once the market reaction to the merchandise is
known, the buyer has the opportunity to mark the
price down once to a predetermined price level dur-
ing the season. Thus, the decision made by the buyer
is the timing of the markdown. In determining the
timing of the markdown, the buyer’s problem is to
maximize the sales revenue subject to the markdown
budget. If the inventory runs out (is cleared) before
the season is over, then the shelf space will be used to
sell other merchandise for the remainder of the sea-
son. Since the buyer’s objective is to maximize sales
revenue, the buyer does not consider the cost of goods
sold for the new sales, while clearly the retailer’s prof-
its are net of the procurement costs. In other words,
the source of incentive misalignment is the fact that
the buyers compensation depends only on the sales,
but not on the profit margin. Later, we discuss differ-
ent possibilities for the use of the shelf space after the
current product is depleted.
The buyer’s markdown timing decision in this set-
ting can be suboptimal with respect to the objective
of the retailer in one of two ways. First, if the market
for the merchandise is relatively weak, the buyer
may mark the price down later than what is optimal
for the retailer as she is constrained by a budget
(since early in the season the markdown will be
applied to more inventory). Second, if the market for
the merchandise is relatively strong, the buyer may
be inclined to mark the price down earlier than what
is optimal for the retailer, clear the inventory and use
the shelf space to generate more sales with a new
merchandise as she is not considering the procure-
ment costs. Our model allows us to investigate these
two risks simultaneously. Using this model, we char-
acterize the retailer’s optimal markdown policy and
the buyer’s markdown decisions as a function of the
market size. We provide a formal explanation for the
possible inefficiencies of the buyer’s decision, and
explain why it can be different from the retailer’s
optimal markdown policy. Our model can also be
used to determine the optimal markdown budget by
the retailer and quantify the effectiveness of using
markdown budgets for incentive alignment. Through
a numerical study, we investigate various factors that
moderate the size of optimal markdown budgets and
resulting effectiveness. We find that there is no “one
size fits all” for retailers when determining their
markdown budgets, and one needs to consider the
level of uncertainty, market size projections, profit
margin and consumer’s responsiveness to mark-
downs. Resulting effectiveness is also a function of
these factors.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we review the research literature. In section 3,
we introduce our model and characterize the optimal
markdown policy for the retailer as well as the mark-
down policy that will be used by the buyer given her
objective and the markdown budget. In sections 4 and
5, we report the results of our numerical study and
explain the effect of different factors on the mark-
down budget set by the retailer. We provide a discus-
sion of our results and conclude in section 6 along
with future research directions.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Clearance Sales
An important strand of literature is focused on help-
ing retailers through prescribing optimal clearance
pricing and markdown policies of seasonal products
with the inclusion of operational considerations.
Smith and Achabal (1998) develop end-of-season
inventory management policies that take into account
the impact of time, inventory, and price on sales rates.
Bitran et al. (1998) study clearance markdowns with a
focus on coordinating between different stores of a
retail chain, and find that their suggested method per-
forms better than the current practice of the retail
company. Mantrala and Rao (2001) provide a detailed
discussion of a decision support system for mark-
down decisions which are applied to take the advan-
tage of price differentiation and customers’ non-
stationary price sensitivity. In an empirical study,
Heching et al. (2002) analyze an apparel retailer’s
markdown pricing by fitting a few common demand
models to the sales data. Their analysis suggest that
the retailer could improve revenue by making smaller
markdowns earlier. Heching and Leung (2005) con-
sider a retailer that determines possible markdowns
at the beginning of each period subject to a mark-
down budget. They formulate an optimization prob-
lem to determine the initial price, markdown price,
and markdown time; and report the difficulty in solv-
ing their optimization problem due to existing nonlin-
earities. Vakhutinsky et al. (2012) develop a
markdown optimization model in which demand is a
function of price, seasonality, and inventory; and then
obtain a monotonically decreasing sequence of mer-
chandise prices that maximizes the revenue. In Yao
et al. (2015), the authors study the effect of multiple
products/locations that share a common budget.
Ramakrishnan (2012) reviews modern markdown
management methods that are used in retail industry.
Markdown optimization can be considered as a
special subclass of dynamic pricing with inventory
considerations where price can only be adjusted
downward. We refer to Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2003) for an introduction and a review of earlier
research in this area. New lines of research in
dynamic pricing include considering strategic con-
sumers (e.g., Aviv and Pazgal 2008), costly price
adjustments (e.g., Celik et al. 2009) and learning (e.g.,
Besbes and Zeevi 2009).
Among the recent research that is more closely
related to our work, Besbes and Maglaras (2012) study
a problem where a set of financial milestone con-
straints on the revenues and sales need to be satisfied
at different time points during the selling season.
Osadchiy and Vulcano (2010) suggest a new mark-
down mechanism where price sensitive consumers
can place binding reservations for the leftover inven-
tory that the retailer will clear at the end of the selling
season. Focusing on pre-season markdowns to speed
up demand learning, Talebian et al. (2014) study a
setting where the retailer determines assortment, but
is uncertain about the market size of different
products.
2.2. Incentives: Retailer Vs. Buyer
Despite the existing literature on markdown opti-
mization, we are not aware of any scholarly work in
regard to the incentive alignment between the retail-
ers and buyers through markdown budgets. In other
words, nearly all literature assumes that buyers’
objective is the same as the retailer’s objective of maxi-
mizing profit. The only exception is Goodwin (1992)
who studies the effect of markdown budgets on sales
and profit. The author reports that 77% of companies
in the study pay bonuses to buying staff for the attain-
ment of the sales budget that increases their earning
between 5.5% and 14.5%. Interestingly, buyers who
attained the budget were not necessarily more suc-
cessful in bringing in sales and profit, compared to
the ones who went over budget. He suggests that
markdowns should be based on sales activity rather
than budgeted prior to season.
Our model can be thought of as a two-stage
Stackelberg game where retail is the leader and sets
the markdown budget whereas buyer is the follower
and decides the markdown timing. There are vari-
ous applications of Stackelberg models in retailing
and more generally supply chain management liter-
ature. However, most of these studies focus on
inter-firm relations, e.g., price competition, category
captainship, and joint contracts, while we focus on
intra-firm interaction between a retail manager and
a merchandise buyer. As an example of few models
which study intra-firm interactions, Pekgun et al.
(2008) study a firm for which pricing and lead time
decisions are made by marketing and production
departments respectively, and analyze the inefficien-
cies created by the decentralization of price and lead
time decisions. They show that coordination can be
achieved, using a transfer price contract with bonus
payments.
In a broader scope, our work is related to the princi-
pal-agent models in economics literature, where the
retailer (principal) cannot observe the true market
size, and the buyer (agent) makes decisions on his
behalf. In many mechanisms, the principal modifies
the agent’s objective function to align it with his goals.
Our setting is unique as the retailer attempts to align
the buyer’s decision through constraints.
Within the literature on principal-agent models,
our problem is particularly related to the literature on
price delegation where research has focused on
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whether the sales force should be given the control
over price (fully or partially) and if so what kind of
compensation scheme should be used. Weinberg
(1975) shows that if the sales personnel are commis-
sioned based on gross margin (as opposed to sales),
they will set prices so as to simultaneously maximize
their own income and the firm’s profits. Lal (1986)
shows that price delegation is more profitable if the
salesperson’s information regarding the selling envi-
ronment is superior to that of the firm’s. Despite these
and other theoretical results that are in favor of price
delegation, in an empirical study, Stephenson et al.
(1979) show that firms that give higher degree of pric-
ing authority generate lower profits. Among the
potential reasons for this discrepancy between the
theory and practice, the authors question the control
value compensation systems based on gross margins
and argue that many sales representatives in the
industry may use sales volume as a surrogate mea-
sure of their performance. The authors argue that, if
these sales representatives are given price authority,
they will use heavy discounting. Our study differs
from the previous research on price delegation, as we
consider a retail environment defined by perishable
products, fixed inventory and valuable shelf space
and investigate the effect of controlling pricing deci-
sions through budgets. In this respect, the use of
markdown budgets by fashion retailers to control the
decisions of the buyers can be justified.
3. Model and Analysis
We consider a retail firm that sells an initial stock n of
a fashion item over a sales period whose length is nor-
malized to 1. The firm starts the season with an initial
price normalized to 1, but has the option to reduce it
to a predetermined markdown price 1  d (0 ≤ d ≤ 1)
during the season [0, 1]. In retail terminology, d repre-
sents off-retail percentage or markdown depth (Clodfelter
2012). We normalize the salvage value to 0.2
We represent the market size with full price with Θ,
which is not known in advance and is a random vari-
able. Its particular realization is denoted by h. We
denote k to be the sales jump after the markdown so
that the demand at the markdown price has a rate of h
(1 + k). With regard to the markdown depth and sales
jump after the markdown, we assume (1  d)
(1 + k) ≥ 1. This assumption ensures that the revenue
rate increases with the markdown, for otherwise there
is no incentive to reduce the price.
As discussed, the misalignment problem appears in
the markdown process when it comes to valuing the
empty shelf space. The buyer’s value of the shelf
space depends only on the generated revenue, while
the retailer’s value considers the profit margin. If the
current item is depleted before the end of the season,
the shelf space can be used to generate revenue for
the remainder of the season. This can be done in one
of the following ways. First, the retailer may extend
the shelf space of an existing basic (e.g., basic shirts or
jeans) item in its assortment. For most basic items,
replenishment within the season is already planned
and the retailer can increase the amount of replenish-
ment within the season to respond to increased
demand due to extended shelf space. Second, the
retailer may extend the shelf space of another fashion
item. For this, the retailer may have to work with a
near-shore supplier with a shorter lead time. The use
of near-shore suppliers for within season replenish-
ment along with off-shore suppliers used for pre-
season orders (dual-sourcing) is an increasing trend
even among the more traditional fashion companies
(Just-style 2014, Just-style 2015). Finally, the retailer
may introduce a new fashion item and allocate the
shelf space to this new item. This option is viable for
most fast-fashion retailers which are more vertically
integrated and can reduce the lead times down to 2–
6 weeks including the design (Caro and Martinez-de-
Albeniz 2015). In fact, assortment changes within the
season are planned for many categories and the tim-
ing of such changes are of crucial importance (Caro
and Gallien 2007).
We use the revenue obtained from the sales of these
new items to obtain the value of the shelf space per
unit of time our analysis. This is similar to the revenue
term used in Araman and Caldentey (2009) for a an
inventory pricing problem with demand learning to
capture the opportunity cost of the retailer’s opera-
tion, except that the authors there assumed a one time
terminal value, not a revenue per unit of time.
The retailer aims to maximize his profit. Since the
procurement cost of the current item is already paid
and sunk, the retailer aims to maximize the revenue
of selling the current item. We can denote f to be the
revenue that can be generated from the shelf space
per unit of time. Then the value of the empty shelves
per unit of time that is assigned by the retailer (i.e.,
“true value” of the shelf space) is cr = mf, where
1  m is the unit cost. The buyer’s goal is to maximize
her compensation which is the sum of her commis-
sion on the current seasonal item and her commission
on the items that she uses to fill the empty shelf space
once the initial item is cleared. Let c represent the
ratio of the commission rate that the buyer collects for
the replacement product (within season replenish-
ment) to the commission that she collects for original
product (preseason orders). Then the value of the
empty shelf space per unit of time that is assigned by
the buyer is cb = cf. In cases where another item in the
same category is used to fill the empty shelf space, it
may be appropriate to set f to E½H where E½H is the
expected demand per unit of time at full price for
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another item in the same category. This is the
approach we take in our numerical experiments.
As explained before, the buyer, in contrast to the
retailer, does not take into account the procurement
cost in her decisions since she is not driven by profit,
but by sales revenue. On the other hand, the commis-
sion percentage of basic products sold through empty
shelf space can be lower than commission on original
fashion products. This implies that shelf space has dif-
ferent values for the retailer and the buyer, and both
cases of cr ≤ cb and cr > cb are possible. This differ-
ence explains the incentive issues between the retailer
and the buyer that makes markdown decision on his
behalf. The difference between the retailer’s and
buyer’s decisions is demonstrated by different values
they associate for the shelf space that becomes avail-
able for use once the current inventory is depleted.
We do not need to have a special form of relationship
between these two parameters for our analysis. We
note here that when cr = cb, the incentives of the retai-
ler and the buyer are aligned for the markdown deci-
sion we are studying here. However, the fact that the
buyer’s compensation depends only on the sales, but
not on the profit margin may lead to other incentive
alignment problems. For example, the buyer may be
inclined to form an initial assortment that consists of
higher price, but less margin products. Likewise, the
buyer may want to pick a higher price, but less mar-
gin replacement item to fill the shelves once the cur-
rent product is cleared. These product selection
decisions are not in the scope of this study.
We can express the objective function, that is,
expected revenue of the retailer (c = cr) or the buyer
(c = cb) as follows:
pðh; tÞ ¼minfth; ng þ ð1 dÞhð1þ Þ
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revenue from sales at markdown price. The last
term represents the expected value of the shelf space
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closed form.




















Theorem 1 shows that the price should be marked
down at the beginning of the season if the market size
is less than the threshold maxf n1þ ;
c
ð1þÞdg. In this case,
the inventory will be depleted before the season is
over and the empty shelves will be utilized for the
remainder of the season. If the market size is larger
than the threshold, a markdown time is chosen such
that the inventory is depleted precisely at the end of
the season. If h ≥ n, it is optimal not to apply any
markdown and have the inventory deplete at full
price at time nh (which is taken as markdown time as
convention).
An example is provided in Figure 1, where we plot
the optimal markdown time and the amount spent on
markdowns (markdown depth multiplied by the
remaining inventory at the time of the markdown) as
a fraction of maximum possible spending on mark-
downs (dn). Notice that dn corresponds to marking
the price down for all inventory at the beginning of
the season. When the market size h is less than 0.672,
it is optimal for the retailer to mark the price down at
the beginning of the season. Otherwise, the
Figure 1 Retailer’s Optimal Markdown Policy n = 1, d = 0.5,
k = 1.5, c = 0.56
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markdown time is such that the inventory is depleted
precisely at the end of the season.
Since the buyer and the retailer assign different val-
ues for the shelf space, their objectives, given in Equa-
tion (1) are also different. The difference between
objectives of the retailer and the buyer implies an
incentive misalignment. Since the timing decision is
actually made by the buyer, the actual markdown
time is different from what is optimal for the retailer.
Theorem 1 suggests that if cr ≤ cb, the threshold for
the market size, before which it is optimal to mark the
prices down right at the beginning of the season is lar-
ger for the buyer. That is, the buyer may be inclined
to mark the prices down when it is still more prof-
itable for the retailer to sell them at full price. On the
other hand, if cr > cb, the threshold for the market size
is smaller for the buyer, and the buyer may be
inclined to mark the prices down later than optimal.
A common method in the retail industry to mitigate
this conflict is using a markdown budget. Markdown
budget is considered as a constraint on how much can
be spent on markdowns. Based on whether buyer sets
a higher value to empty shelves or a lower value, the
inequality in the constraint has a different direction.
Consider the case where cr ≤ cb, and let a 2 [0, 1]
denote the markdown budget represented as a frac-
tion of maximum possible spending on markdowns.
If the budget is set at a, then the retailer can mark the
price down when there are at most an units in inven-
tory. Therefore any markdown should be delayed
until at least (1  a)n units are sold. That is, the mark-
down time cannot be earlier than ð1aÞnh , the time when
the [(1  a)n]th item is demanded under a demand
function with rate h. A similar argument can be made
for the case cr > cb, where the buyer is less inclined to
mark the price down than the retailer and the mark-
down budget enforces a minimum amount of mark-
down to be taken. Therefore, the buyer’s optimal





h g; if cr  cb;
minftbðhÞ;
nð1aÞ
h g; if cr [ cb:
(
ð4Þ
Note that the buyer’s decision under a markdown
budget constraint may be suboptimal. We measure
the inefficiency of delegating the markdown timing
decision to the buyer and controlling her through a
markdown budget by comparing her resulting
expected profit to what can be obtained if the retailer
determines the markdown time on his own after the
market size information is revealed. Particularly, we
use 1  prðh; tbðhjaÞÞ=pr ðhÞ, which quantifies the
profit loss as a fraction of the optimal revenue that
would be obtained if the retailer determines the mark-
down time by himself.
Figure 2 illustrates how markdown time and profit
loss change as a function of market size when cr ≤ cb.
Notice that the case of “Budget = 1” correspond to
the case where the budget constraint is completely
relaxed, and the buyer can set markdown time as she
wishes, and potentially different from what is optimal
for the retailer.
It is interesting to note that markdown budget hurts
the retailer when the markdown is needed the most,
that is, when the market size is small. Notice that the
Figure 2 Markdown Time and Profit Loss under Budget n = 1, d = 0.5, k = 1.5, cr = 0.56, cb = 0.8
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buyer may not be able to give any markdown if mar-
ket size is small because the budget constraint can
never be satisfied. Also, notice that the buyer requires
a better market than the retailer for not marking the
price down right away. With the budget constraint,
the buyer cannot mark down the product right away.
Figure 3 illustrates the change in markdown time
and profit loss as h changes for an example where
cr > cb. Notice that in this case, the markdown budget
is the minimum allowed discount.
When the budget is set to 1, the buyer has no
option, but to mark the price down at the beginning
at time 0. At the other extreme, when the budget is set
to 0, there is no limit on how much discount the buyer
can offer and the buyer can mark the price down
whenever it is optimal for her to do so. This may lead
her to mark the price down later than what is optimal
for the retailer. This happens when the market is low.
When the budget is set to an intermediate level (0.25),
the buyer may be forced to marking the price down at
a relatively good market despite the fact that this is
not optimal for neither the buyer nor the retailer. Set-
ting the budget to 1 may lead to substantial losses for
the retailer for this example. Setting the budget to 0
dominates setting the budget to an intermediate level.
We assume a leader–follower framework for the
markdown budget decision. The retailer is the leader
and sets the budget first, and the buyer is the follower
and determines the markdown time subject to the
budget set by the retailer. When the retailer sets the
budget, the season has not started and the informa-
tion regarding the market size is not revealed yet. We
represent the the retailer’s belief about market size by
random variable Θ. Therefore the retailer determines
the markdown budget considering the uncertainty of
the market size. We assume that the retailer is risk-
neutral and determines the budget level a that maxi-
mizes its expected profit. More formally, the retailer’s
optimal markdown budget is given by
a ¼ arg max
0 a 1
EH½prðH; tbðHjaÞÞ: ð5Þ
We can measure the ex ante efficiency of an incen-
tive alignment policy that uses the optimal markdown
budget by profit loss percentage defined as:





which is the expected value of the profit loss as a
fraction of the retailer’s optimal expected revenue.
3.1. Extension: Stochastic Demand
Our results can be extended to a more realistic case
where demand is stochastic. More precisely, we
assume that the market size with full price follows a
Poisson process with rate h, so the expected revenue
for a given markdown time 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 is equal to:






nNhðtÞð Þþg þ cð1 AnÞþ
 ð7Þ
where Nx(y) represents the number of arrivals over
a period of length y in a homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess with rate x, and An is the nth arrival time of a
non-homogeneous Poisson process with a rate of h
in [0, t] and h(1 + k) in [t, 1]. Notice that event An
Figure 3 Markdown Time and Profit Loss under Budget n = 1, d = 0.5, k = 1.5, cr = 0.56, cb = 0.32
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may never happen before the end of the season, and
therefore we look at (1  An)+ = max{0, (1  An)}.
The optimization problem corresponds to
~pðh; cÞ ¼ max
s2T
E½~pðh; c; sÞ; ð8Þ
where T represents the set of stopping times s satis-
fying two conditions: (1) 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and (2) Nh(s) ≤ n
almost surely. This stochastic version of our prob-
lem is similar to Feng and Gallego (1995).
In order to capture the stochastic nature of demand,
it is required to formulate models based on stochastic
dynamic programming and solve them, usually
through development of heuristics. Rather than
attempting to solve the stochastic stopping problem
and obtain ~pðh; cÞ, we will propose a heuristic based
on the deterministic version of the problem. The
deterministic solution suggests a stopping-time
heuristic for the stochastic problem. Denote k(h, c) =
ht*(h, c). Let tk(h, c) = k(h, c)/h be the time it takes to
sell k(h, c) units if the demand is deterministic with
rate h and let Ak(h, c) be the (random) time it takes to
sell k(h, c) units if the demand follows a Poisson pro-
cess with rate h. The heuristic switches the price at
min{Ak(h, c), tk(h, c)}. The next theorem shows that this
stopping-time heuristic is asymptotically optimal and
suggests that retailers that deal with a large number
of units may use the deterministic solution to manage
their markdowns.
THEOREM 2. The heuristic policy that switches the price
at min{Ak(h, c), tk(h, c)} is asymptotically optimal (as n
goes to infinity) in the stochastic problem. The expected
revenue of these heuristic approaches p*(h, c).
Theorem 2 demonstrates that the stopping time
heuristic is asymptotically optimal, which shows that
marking down in an attempt to compensate for typi-
cal stochastic variations in demand captures only sec-
ond order increases in revenue. These results are
consistent with some evidences in retailing that the
first round of markdowns has a substantially larger
effect on revenues compared to other rounds of mark-
downs which have a secondary order impact (Tale-
bian and van Ryzin 2014). There exist anecdotal
evidences that some large department stores reduced
the number of markdown rounds as it was shown
that it was better to discard items earlier and create
space for new items.
Theorem 2 means that for the stochastic problem
given in Equation (8), the buyer’s optimization is over
T which now represents the set of stopping times s
such that 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and (1  a)n ≤ Nh(s) ≤ n almost
surely. In this case, we can also update the buyer’s
stopping-time heuristic based on the deterministic




Given that a typical retailer deals with a large vol-
ume of merchandise and based on the asymptotic
optimality result provided in Theorem 2, we focus
our attention to the deterministic problem from this
point on.
4. Optimal Markdown Budgets
In the next two sections, we provide numerical exam-
ples to show that setting the markdown budgets may
be a non-trivial task and investigate how different fac-
tors moderate the amount of markdown budget one
should set prior to the season and resulting efficiency
of the optimal markdown policy. In doing so, we did
our best to calibrate our parameters with the industry.
For example, according to US Census Bureau, gross
margin was on the average 45% for clothing and
clothing accessories stores in 2014 (US Census Bureau
2014). We use m = 0.5 in most of our examples, and
also study the impact of m separately. Soysal and
Krishnamurthi (2012) study a leading specialty appa-
rel retailer, and report an average first markdown of
38% of the retail price. In their study of fast fashion,
Cachon and Swinney (2011) choose markdown
depths of 5%, 15%, and 25%. Caro and Gallien (2012)
report that the average item at a Zara store collects
85% of its full price, while the usual range in the
industry is 60–70%. We choose markdown depths of
15%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 45% in our numerical study.
We confirmed our choice of these two parameters
also with the operations director of a major European
apparel retail company. In addition, we discussed our
assumptions and verified that most of our assump-
tions are valid for this company. Majority of the prod-
ucts are ordered only once prior to the season, and
despite the retailer’s efforts to order the right prod-
ucts prior to season, the company is also often faced
with the necessity to liquidate its slow-moving inven-
tory through markdowns. For this company, the per-
centage of items sold at a markdown are in the same
range with leading fast-fashion companies including
Zara and H&M. We learned that usually within a
week after a product is put on shelves, the retailer has
a very good understanding of the demand in the rest
of the season. We also confirmed that most benefits
are obtained in the first markdown, the retailer mea-
sures and monitors the value of the shelf space and
there are incentive alignment problems between the
buyer team and the retailer. Based on these observa-
tions, we believe that the assumptions of our model
and the parameters of our numerical investigation are
well calibrated with the company’s operation.
In our analysis, we normalize the initial inventory n
to 1. Remember that the demand rate at the full price
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is represented by h, and the retailer’s belief about
market size is represented by random variable Θ. In
order to reflect the difference between the value of
shelf space that is assigned by the retailer and the
buyer, we assume that the shelf space is used for
another product in the same category. This new pro-
duct’s market size is identically distributed as and
independent from the current product’s market size.
Therefore we set cr ¼ E½Hm and cb ¼ E½Hc. Most of
our analysis is for the case cr < cb which is a more
probable scenario.
We use the modified PERT distribution (Vose 2008)
for the random variable Θ. The modified PERT distri-
bution is a 4-parameter distribution and is frequently
used to model expert opinion. Expert opinion is used
to specify the minimum (a), maximum (b), most-likely
(Mo) values and a fourth parameter (s) controls the
shape. The probability density function of the modi-
fied PERT distribution is given as follows:




where B(g1, g2) is the beta function, and
g1 ¼ 1þ sð
Mo a
b a Þ; g2 ¼ 1þ sð
bMo
b a Þ:
The mean (l) and variance (r2) are
l ¼ aþ sMoþ b
sþ 2 ; r
2 ¼ ðl aÞðb lÞ
sþ 3 :
We use the modified PERT distribution since it has
a bounded domain and we can easily control the
shape and mode with two dedicated parameters.
Note that modified PERT distribution is a specific
version of the four parameter Beta distribution. When
s = 0, the distribution reduces to uniform distribution.
Since PERT or Beta offer a lot of flexibility in model-
ing the shape of a probability distribution, they are
commonly used in industry.
We assume that the maximum possible value for Θ
is 1. This ensures that the retailer’s initial stocking
decision leads to 100% service level even in the case of
best market outcome. In addition, we assume that the
minimum possible value for Θ is 1/(1 + k). This
ensures that the retailer is able to finish his inventory
by marking the price down at the beginning of the sea-
son even in the case of worst market outcome. Consis-
tent with this discussion, we set a ¼ 11þ and b = 1.
We first note that setting a markdown budget is a
non-trivial task when cr < cb. Figure 4 shows the per-
centage profit loss of the retailer as a function of the
markdown budget for three different problems. The
expected profit under a markdown budget policy for
a particular setting is a complex function of the price,
demand and uncertainty parameters as well as the
amount of budget. A very small budget will limit the
buyer’s ability to respond to a low market and a very
large budget will lead to the buyer marking the prices
down when it is not really necessary. In a particular
problem, a markdown budgeting policy’s perfor-
mance will depend on the probability of these two
events taking place and the extent of the damages of
these events on retailer profitability. In some settings,
the risk of cutting the prices down prematurely out-
weighs the risk of not being able to respond to a bad
market. In some of these problems, it may be optimal
to set a markdown budget to close to zero and essen-
tially stop the buyer from marking the price down
altogether. An example is given for the markdown
depth d = 0.45 where the losses due to an unnecessary
price cut is substantial.
In some other settings, the risk of not being able to
cut the price down when it is really necessary out-
weighs the risk of buyer making early markdowns. In
some of these problems, it may be optimal to set the
markdown budget to one and give the buyer the com-
plete flexibility in marking the prices down. An exam-
ple is given for the markdown depth d = 0.15. Since
the depth of themarkdown is small, the retailer should
mark the price down immediately in most outcomes of
the market. Therefore, the potential damage due to an
earlier-than-necessary markdown is not high in com-
parison to delaying the markdown and having some
leftover inventory at the end of the season.
Finally in some settings, the size of the markdown
budget may have a more interesting effect on prof-
itability. An example is given for the markdown
depth d = 0.30. When the markdown budget is small,
Figure 4 Profit Loss (%), m = 0.5, c = 1, k = 1, h  PERT(0.5, 1,
0.9, 4)
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the buyer’s ability to respond to a low market is very
limited. When the markdown budget is at the inter-
mediate range, it allows the buyer to adequately
address the low market, hence the expected profit
goes up (and the profit loss goes down) as the mark-
down budget approaches roughly the half of the max-
imum budget. However, once we go beyond this
level, the risk of having an early markdown out-
weighs the benefit of responding to a bad market and
the expected profit decreases again. Therefore, it is
optimal to set the markdown budget to an intermedi-
ate level, that is, completely stopping or freeing the
buyer is not an optimal policy.
Setting the optimal markdown budget is different
in the case where cr > cb. We have done several
numerical tests with different sets of parameters, and
in all of them the profit loss is monotone as a function
of markdown budget. It implies that optimal budget
is either 0 or 1. Figure 5 shows the percentage profit
loss, and as can be confirmed, the only candidates for
the optimal budget is 0, that is, setting the buyer com-
pletely free, or 1, i.e., forcing the buyer to take mark-
downs right away. When the markdown depth d is
high, markdowns may lead to significant revenue
losses if they are not taken at the right time. In this
case, the retailer prefers to set the markdown budget
to 0 and not force the buyer to take any markdowns.
When the markdown depth d is low, the revenue leak
with the markdowns is not significant and the retailer
prefers markdowns in most outcomes of the market.
In this case, the retailer is better off by setting the bud-
get to 1 and ensuring that the buyer marks the price
down as soon as possible.
5. Comparative Statics
In this section, we report the results of our computa-
tional study that investigates the effect of various fac-
tors on the value of the optimal markdown budget
and its efficiency. We start by focusing on the more
complicated case where cr < cb. We first look at the
effect of the most likely value of the demand distribu-
tion (Mo). Figure 6 reports the optimal markdown
budget and the corresponding profit losses. Notice
that the optimal budget is shown as a fraction of the
maximum budget which is given by initial inventory
Equation (1) multiplied by the depth of the mark-
down (d) and is equal to d.
Notice that when Mo is small, we expect the
demand to be weak and anticipate marking the prices
very early in the season. In this case, it is optimal for
the retailer to set a markdown budget as high as pos-
sible and set the buyer almost free on her markdown
decisions. Nevertheless, there is still some discrep-
ancy between the motives of the buyer and the retai-
ler. It is more profitable for the buyer to mark the
prices earlier than what is optimal for the retailer
leading to profit losses up to 2–3%. As Mo goes up, it
is optimal to set the markdown budget to an interme-
diate level as the retailer wants to further limit the
markdowns taken unnecessarily early by the buyer.
The profit losses also increase. As Mo grows further,
the retailer decreases the markdown budgets as it
anticipates better market. When Mo is very large, the
probability of earlier than optimal markdowns is
reduced, leading to smaller profit losses.
In Figure 7, we investigate the effect of the shape
parameter of the demand distribution (s). Notice that
as s decreases the variance of the market size Θ
increases. Clearly, as there is more uncertainty
regarding the market, the retailer increases the mark-
down budget in order to allow the buyer respond to
more probable low market. When the uncertainty is
low, it is possible to finetune the markdown budget
and force the buyer to make markdown decisions that
are aligned with the profitability of the retailer. How-
ever, as uncertainty increases, this is no longer possi-
ble and the profit losses are larger.
In Figure 8, the effect of the sales jump k, is investi-
gated. Note that as k changes, we also change the min-
imum value of the PERT distribution to 1/(1 + k). As
k increases, the retailer finds the markdown to be an
effective option since it can clear the inventory faster
and use the shelf space for a new product for a longer
period of time, and therefore increases the budget.
Once k reaches a certain high level, the retailer sets
the budget to maximum and allow the buyer to be
completely free in her markdown decisions to
respond to market. The initial increase of k however
may lead the buyer to mark the price down earlier
Figure 5 Profit Loss (%), m = 0.5, c = 0.3, k = 1, h  PERT(0.5, 1,
0.9, 4)
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than necessary yielding an increase in the profit loss.
However, as k increases further, the retailer’s and
buyer’s incentives are better aligned and the gap goes
down. It implies that as k becomes smaller further,
the actual budget goes up. The profit loss is smaller
when k is very low or very high, since these cases lead
to a better alignment of the objectives of the retailer
and the buyer. Conversely, the profit losses are higher
when k is at moderate levels.
In Figure 9, the effect of the profit margin m is
investigated. Having a higher procurement cost hurts
the retailer in case of an unnecessary markdown as
this cost needs to be incurred when shelves are
stocked with new products. Therefore, the retailer
Figure 6 Effect of Mo, d = 0.3, m = 0.5, c = 1, k = 1, h  PERT(0.5, 1, Mo, s)
Figure 7 Effect of s, d = 0.3, m = 0.5, c = 1, k = 1, h  PERT(0.5, 1, Mo, s)
Sen and Talebian: Markdown Budgets for Retail Buyers
1886 Production and Operations Management 26(10), pp. 1875–1892, © 2017 Production and Operations Management Society
reduces the budget as m goes down. As m goes down,
we also see that the profit loss increases due to an
increased misalignment of the buyer’s and retailer’s
objectives. When m is very large, the procurement
cost is very close to zero and the buyer’s incentive is
better aligned with the retailer’s objective. Therefore,
the retailer simply sets the budget to maximum and
have the buyer make markdown decisions freely in
this case.
In Figure 10, the effect of the buyer’s commission
parameter c is investigated. Note that when c is less
(more) than m = 0.5, the empty shelf space is more
(less) valuable for the retailer than the buyer. When
c = m = 0.5, the shelf space valuations are the same
Figure 8 Effect of k, d = 0.3, m = 0.5, c = 1, h  PERT(1/(1 + k), 1, 0.75, s)
Figure 9 Effect of m, d = 0.3, k = 1, c = 1, h  PERT(0.5, 1, 0.75, s)
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and there is no incentive misalignment. First note that
when d = 0.3 and c < m, it is optimal for the retailer to
set the budget to zero. In this case the profit losses are
also zero. When c = m it is optimal to set the budget to
1 as the incentives are aligned. As c increases beyond
m, the markdown budget is lowered and the profit
losses see a steady increase. When d = 0.2 it is optimal
to set the budget 1 to for all values of c. When c < m,
the retailer prefers the buyer to mark the price down at
the beginning of the season. When c > m the retailer
sets the buyer free in markdown decisions. In both of
these scenarios, because the revenue leak is very small,
the profit losses are also very small. When c = m, the
incentives are again aligned, the retailer sets the buyer
free and the buyer makes a markdown decision that is
also optimal for the retailer leading to zero profit loss.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we study the markdown decisions of a
retailer which sells a given inventory of fashionable
product over a finite season. Different from previous
research in this area, we consider the fact that the
markdown decision is delegated to an agent (retail
buyer), which is commonly observed in practice. The
retail buyer may be better informed about the market,
but her objective is to maximize sales, whereas, in con-
trast, the retailer’s objective is to maximize profit. The
retailer uses a markdown budget to control the
buyer’s decision and maintain a profitable margin.
The buyer’s markdown timing decision in this setting
can be suboptimal with respect to the objective of the
retailer in one of two ways. First, if the market for the
merchandise is relatively weak, the buyer may mark
the price down later than what is optimal for the
retailer as she is constrained by a budget (since early
in the season the markdown will be applied to more
inventory). Second, if the market for the merchandise
is relatively strong, the buyer may be inclined to mark
the price down earlier than what is optimal for the
retailer, clear the inventory and use the shelf space to
generate more sales. Our model allows us to investi-
gate these two risks simultaneously. Using this model,
we characterize the retailer’s optimal markdown
policy and the buyer’s markdown decisions and
provide a formal explanation for the possible
inefficiencies of the latter. Our model can also be used
to determine the optimal markdown budget by the
retailer and quantify the cost of the misalignment of the
buyer’s incentives with the objective of the retailer.
We find that a very small budget will limit the
buyer’s ability to respond to a low market and a very
large budget will lead to the buyer marking the prices
down when it is not really necessary. In a particular
problem, a markdown budgeting policy’s performance
will depend on the probability of these two events tak-
ing place and the extent of the damages of these events
on retailer profitability. Our numerical results show
that using suboptimal budgets (either excessive or
insufficient) may be destructive, leading to substantial
profit losses. We also investigate the effects of various
factors on the optimal budget and the resulting profit
losses. Our results indicate that markdown budgets
should be set higher when the market expectations are
lower, the demand uncertainty is higher (i.e., the mer-
chandise in question has higher fashion content), the
Figure 10 Effect of c, k = 1, m = 0.5, h  PERT(0.5, 1, 0.75, 4)
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market is more responsive to markdowns, and the ini-
tial markup is higher. The profit losses due to
misalignment of the objectives are typically higher
when the expected market is at moderate levels, the
uncertainty is high, the initial markup is low, and
the markdown depth is at moderate levels. Even when
the markdown budgets are optimally determined,
remaining losses can be as high as 4–5%.
We note that this study, to our knowledge, is to first
to consider incentive issues in markdown pricing for
retail firms. We study the effectiveness of using one
particular (but commonly used) mechanism - mark-
down budget - to align the incentives of the buyers
with the profitability of the firm. Future work can
extend this study to many different directions. First,
one can consider the use of other mechanisms and
investigate whether these would lead to better incen-
tive alignment in this setting. Second, we consider a
single item and a single location; one can study a set-
ting where markdowns need to be coordinated across
different items and locations. Third, one can consider
selling multiple versions of a product at a time and
the possibility of product rollover strategies (see
Liang et al. 2014). Fourth, one can investigate the
effect of buyer’s gradual learning about the market
(as opposed to instantaneous learning in this study).
Fifth, including competition is another possible ave-
nue for extension; we refer to Sen (2016) for the effect
of competition on markdown decisions.
We finally note that markdown budgets are in close
relationship with another prevalent tool in retail
industry: Open-To-Buy (OTB) system. The OTB sys-
tem is used since the 1920s (Pasdermadjian 1954) and
controls how much money a buyer can allocate for
new purchases considering sales (regular and mark-
downs) and inventory. In this system, budgeted
markdowns affect not only the markdown decisions
of the buyer but also her purchasing decisions. Study-
ing the effectiveness of this system when the demand
is uncertain and the buyer’s objective is in conflict
with retailer’s profitability may be an important ave-
nue for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
THEOREM 1. Case 1: n ≥ th
One of the following two cases can happen:
i: 1  t  ðnthÞhð1þÞ, or
hðþ1Þn
h  t :
pðh; c; tÞ ¼thþ ð1 tÞhð1 dÞð1þ Þ
¼hð1 dÞð1þ Þ þ thðd þ dÞ
) tðh; cÞ ¼ hðþ 1Þ  n
h
:
ii. ðnthÞhð1þÞ  1  t, or t 
hðþ1Þn
h :
pðh; c; tÞ ¼thþ ð1 dÞðn thÞ þ c 1 t n th
hð1þ Þ
 
¼nð1 dÞ þ c nc









 h : hðþ1Þnh ;





Case 2: n ≤ th.
pðh; c; tÞ ¼nþ ð1 tÞc;




THEOREM 2. The proof follows the same idea in Gallego
and van Ryzin (1994), Theorem 5. Let ph(h, c) be the
expected revenue of the stopping-time heuristic. The
hypothetical revenue of a deterministic problem can be
defined as p*(h, c) = maxtp(h, c,t) = p(h, c, t
*(h, c)). It
is easy to show that ~pðh; cÞ  pðh; cÞ.
We define a wasteful heuristic such that repre-
senting the profit of this wasteful heuristic by





pðh; cÞ , it is enough to show that
pwðh; cÞ
pðh; cÞ approaches to 1.







This case correspond to markdown at middle of the
season. In this case tðh; cÞ ¼ nhð1þ Þ  c
h
leading to
pðh; cÞ ¼p h; c; nhð1þ Þ  c
h
 






We define the following wasteful heuristic. We
reserve
hð1þ Þ  n
 units to be sold at full price,
and the rest to be sold at the markdown price. We
do not use possible empty shelves at end of the
period. Since the wasteful reserves
hð1þ Þ  n

units
to be sold at the full price and
n  hð1þ Þ  n

¼ ð1þ Þðn hÞ

units to be sold at
the markdown price
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hð1þ Þ  n
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Based on Gallego (1992) and using the Cauchy–
Schwartz inequality, one can show that:





hð1þ Þ  n

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¼ pðh; cÞ  1
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1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi















The last term approaches to zero as n and h
approach infinity, and therefore
pwðh; cÞ
pðh; cÞ approaches 1.
Case 2: n ≤ h.
This case corresponds to no markdown. In this
case tðh; cÞ ¼ n
h
leading to
pðh; cÞ ¼p h; c; n
h
 




We define the following wasteful heuristic. We
reserve all n units to be sold at full price





Based on Gallego (1992) and using the Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality, one can show that:
pwðh; cÞ





The last term approaches to zero as n and h
approach infinity, and therefore
pwðh; cÞ
pðh; cÞ approaches 1.







This case corresponds to an immediate mark-
down. In this case t*(h, c) = 0 leading to
pðh; cÞ ¼p h; c; 0ð Þ
¼nð1 dÞð1þ Þ þ cð1 n
hð1þ ÞÞ
þ:
We define the following wasteful heuristic. We
reserve all n units to be sold at full price
pwðh; cÞ ¼ ð1 dÞE min Nhð1þÞðtÞ; n
 	 




Based on Gallego (1992) and using the Cauchy–
Schwartz inequality, one can show that:













The last term approaches to zero as n and h approach
infinity, and therefore
pwðh; cÞ
pðh; cÞ approaches 1. h
Notes
1In addition to overbuying and poor pricing, there can be
other reasons for markdowns, e.g., price discrimination,
selling errors, price competition, sales policies, and excite-
ment creation (Wingate et al. 1972); these are out of this
paper’s scope.
2Representing initial price by p1, markdown price by p2,
and salvage value by s, our normalization setting initial
price to 1, and salvage value to 0 implies that
d = 1  (p2  s)/(p1  s).
3Any markdown time later than 1 implies that there is no
markdown.
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